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IN THE 
LrAIiCOLR'i OFAPPE.-iL.r 
State oi Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Mark D. Talbot, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for seven counts of distribution of a 
controlled substance, two counts of possession oi J con ironed suDstance, and three 
counts of possession ,\ .::u^
 r \ ,_ . \ ; - . :, .: ..• :._•• ./•|>.i:.:iionui ider the 
pour , . * ; : * . • - "*- . : - * 03' ?• :'. (West Si ipp. 2009). 
STA TEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1, Defendant claims that his detention escalated into an unlawful arrest when 
Officer Moore detained and arrested him without the authorization from Sheriff 
: erkiiis. :i-j- di^-j? ih^t ;ho vwd.-rxv ..-: ineihjir^h, *a!";v-- ;.' ; - . . ;- :-v:>;.o 
sliouH have Iv^n suppressed and ihjf the denial of his motion to suppress 
constituted reversible error. Did the trial court properly deny the motion to 
suppress when it determined that probable cause justified any detention, 
whether a stop or an arrest? 
Standard of Review. In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, 
the appellate court reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error and its 
conclusions of law for correctness. State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, Tf 11,162 P.3d 
1106. 
2. Should this Court review Defendant's voir dire claim, where Defendant 
has not presented a record adequate to support it? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this question. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provision is relevant to the issues on appeal: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by amended information with seven first degree 
felony counts of distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (West Supp. 2006); one second degree felony and one 
misdemeanor count of possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (West Supp. 2006); and four misdemeanor counts of 
2 
possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) 
(West 2004). R96-100. 
During pre-trial proceedings, Defendant moved twice to suppress the 
evidence. See R252-56,190-97. The trial court denied both motions. See R103-05; 
233-40. 
A jury found Defendant guilty of the first twelve charges, but acquitted him 
on the final drug paraphernalia charge. R82-86. The trial court entered judgment, 
sentencing Defendant to seven prison terms of five years to life on his distribution 
charges; a prison term of one to fifteen years on the second degree felony possession 
charge; a one-year jail term on the misdemeanor possession charge; and three one-
year jail terms on the drug paraphernalia charges. R20-22. He ordered that two of 
the distribution sentences run consecutively and that the remainder of the terms run 
concurrently. Id. 
Defendant timely appealed. R18. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On January 24, 2007, a group gathered for a party at Defendant's Panguitch 
home. R381:15, 81 The group included Michelle (Hatch) Partridge; her cousin, 
Ronnie Davenport; Defendant's former wife, Michel Clark Lamb; Michel's sister, 
Stacy Clark; and Vance Brown. R381:82, 87, 90, 98. A "pipe was being passed 
around," and "everybody was getting high." R381:81. 
Defendant drew a line of methamphetamine for Michelle (Hatch) Partridge, 
who snorted it. R381:82. A few days later Michelle's probation officer, Reid Bean, 
and a female officer conducted a urinalysis on Michelle. R381:82-83. The urinalysis 
came back "dirty," and Michelle told Officer Bean and Sheriff James D. ("Danny) 
Perkins about the party. R38T.83. She told them that "she had used 
methamphetamine[] which had been given to her by [Defendant]." R381:15. She 
testified at the preliminary hearing and at trial. She received no deal for testifying. 
R381:83. 
Michel Lamb went to the party "to drink some alcohol." R381:87. While she 
was there, Defendant took her aside to talk and "broke out a methamphetamine 
1
 The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing. Defendant's motions to 
suppress below argued the facts presented at that hearing. R190-96; 252-53. 
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pipe/7 R381:88. She ''took a hit of meth off of it with him in the bathroom/7 Id. She 
later told Sheriff Perkins that she had used methamphetamine with Defendant. 
R381:89, 91. She testified pursuant to an agreement that she would not be charged 
for that conduct. R381:92. 
Stacy Clark had known Defendant most of her life. R381:98. At the party, 
Defendant "gave [her] a line of methamphetamine[] and then there was a pipe 
sitting on the table/' R381:99. She snorted the line and smoked from the pipe. Id. 
The next day she returned to Defendant's house and "did another line of 
"methamphetamine[]" that she got from Defendant. R381:100. A few days later, on 
January 28, Defendant called and then met her at the city dump. R381:101. He gave 
her "a line of methamphetamine[]" and "another line to take with [her], put in a 
dollar bill." R381:102. 
On February 9, Stacy made "a distress call" to Sheriff Perkins. R381:15. She 
had not used methamphetamine between 2003 and 2007. R381:107. "[She] was very 
depressed after using [methamphetamine] again and [she had] taken an overdose of 
[Prozac]." R381-.105. She told the sheriff about the overdose. R381:18. He 
"dispatched emergency personnel and then ... traveled to her home." R381:18. She 
told him that Defendant had given her methamphetamine on January 24 and that 
"she was ashamed of herself that she'd relapsed." R381:19. 
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Defendant also gave methamphetamine to Jeff Burton. Jeff had known 
Defendant his whole life. R381:lll. Jeff had been convicted of methamphetamine 
use and was on parole on February 28, 2007. R381:110. That day he was given a 
urinalysis, which gave negative results. Id. Immediately following the test, he went 
to Defendant's house "[t]o return some CD's that [Defendant] had [him] burn/' 
R381:lll. While there, Defendant got methamphetamine from the counter and 
loaded up a pipe. Id. He offered some to Jeff. Id. They smoked the pipe together. 
Id. The following day, probation officer Reid Bean, who had learned of Jeff s trip to 
Defendant's house, required him to submit to another urinalysis. R381:21,112. This 
test came back positive. R381:113. 
Jeff then met with Sheriff Perkins. Id. He told the sheriff that Defendant had 
given him methamphetamine on February 28 and that he had smoked it at 
Defendant's house. R381:24. The sheriff made a deal with him. R381:113. The 
sheriff asked him "to report to us if there was any more methamphetamine[] offered 
to him by [Defendant]." R381:38. Jeff could either testify against Defendant or deal 
with the consequences of his own drug use and parole violation. R381:113. 
On March 6, Jeff went to Defendant's house to take him more CDs. Id. He 
told Defendant that he had the CDs, and Defendant reached into his pocket and put 
methamphetamine on the seat of Jeff's car. R381:114-15. Defendant told Jeff that he 
had "three boulders." R381:115. After meeting with Defendant, Jeff immediately 
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called Sheriff Perkins. R381:115. They met, and Jeff gave the methamphetamine to 
the sheriff. Id. 
Sheriff Perkins then contacted Officer Kevin Moore. R381:27. He told Officer 
Moore that "if he happened to see [Defendant], to go ahead and pull him over and 
detain him until —you know, let [the sheriff] know that he had pulled him over/' 
R381:27. The sheriff "was going to get a warrant for [Defendant's] vehicle and his 
person." R381:63. A little later, Officer Moore saw Defendant in his vehicle near 
Main Street and 100 North. R381:62. Officer Moore turned on his red lights, and 
Defendant pulled over. Id. Officer Moore had Defendant shut off and get out of the 
truck. R381:62-63. He then "pat[ted] [Defendant] down for weapons" and "placefd] 
some handcuffs on him for his safety and for [Officer Moore's] safety." Id. Sheriff 
Perkins then came by and told Officer Moore "to stay there with [Defendant] and 
just detain him for a minute," while the sheriff went to see the county attorney. 
R381:63. Officer Moore detained Defendant for ten or fifteen minutes. Id. 
The sheriff then called Officer Moore and told him to go ahead and arrest 
Defendant. Id.; R381:27. The sheriff felt he had probable cause to believe that 
Defendant had "distributed methamphetamine[] just a few minutes—just a little 
while earlier." R381:27. The sheriff also said that he "was going to get a warrant for 
[Defendant's] home and his vehicle and bodily fluids." Id. 
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Officer Moore told Defendant about the conversation with the sheriff, read 
him his Miranda rights, and patted him down—"searched him to take him to the 
jail." R381:63. Officer Moore found a canister containing two or three small rocks of 
methamphetamine in Defendant's pocket. R381:64-65. He impounded the vehicle, 
which was towed to the sally port at the jail. R381:65, 70. Officer Moore, Deputy 
Pollock, and Trooper Keyser then "did an inventory on the vehicle." R381:65. 
During the inventory they found another canister, a cappuccino canister that 
contained a green, leafy substance that later testing identified as marijuana. 
R381:66-67. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant claims that Officer Kevin Moore arrested him in violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights because Officer Moore effected the arrest before Sheriff 
James Perkins authorized him to do so. This Court should decline review of the 
claim, as Defendant has provided no authority and no reasoned analysis to support 
a claim that the lawfulness of an arrest depends on a superior's authorizing it. 
While the State disputes Defendant's claim that the initial detention here was an 
arrest, it does not matter whether it was an arrest or merely a stop, as Office Moore 
had probable cause to justify an arrest. 
2. Defendant claims that an error may have occurred during voir dire, asserts 
that the record is insufficient to permit a review of this claim, and therefore argues 
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for reversal based on the possibility that error occurred. Defendant, as the 
appellant, has the burden and duty to support his allegations with an adequate 
record. But he has not presented a record adequate to permit review of this claim, 
and this Court should therefore decline to review it. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ADDRESS 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
IMPROPERLY DENIED HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS, 
BECAUSE THE CLAIM IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED; IN ANY 
CASE, PROBABLE CAUSE JUSTIFIED OFFICER MOORE'S 
DETENTION AND SEARCH OF DEFENDANT 
Defendant claims that his detention was a de facto arrest. Br. Appellant at 9. 
He argues that the sheriff had only authorized Officer Moore to make a detention. 
Id. As a consequence, he asserts that Officer Moore's actions were unauthorized and 
unreasonable and that the de facto arrest therefore violated his constitutional rights. 
Id. Defendant elaborates, "In other words, [Officer Moore] expanded what was 
intended to merely be an investigative detention, into an arrest, without a 
reasonable and legally sufficient justification; indeed since [Officer Moore] did not 
intend to arrest the Defendant (even though he in fact had done so), there is no 
justification posited by [Officer Moore], let alone a reasonable and legally sufficient 
one." Id. at 9-10. Defendant claims that the methamphetamine found on Defendant 
9 
when he was searched was "fruit of the poisonous tree" and should have been 
excluded. Id. at 9. 
Because Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed, this Court should not 
review it. In any case, the constitutional question is not whether an arrest is 
authorized by an officer's superior; rather, the question is whether there is a 
reasonable basis for the detention, i.e., reasonable suspicion to justify a level one 
detention, or probable cause to justify a level two detention. State v. Prows, 2007 UT 
App 409, \ 4 n.3,178 P.3d 908 (citing State v. Alvarez, 2006 UT 61, \ 10,147 P.3d 425). 
A. Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant to 
provide developed argument containing "the contentions and reasons ... with 
respect to the issues presented ... with citations to authorities, statutes, and the parts 
of the record relied on." Utah appellate courts also have cautioned that an appellant 
cannot use the court as "'a depository in which [the appellant] may dump the 
burden of argument and research'" Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, 1 9, 194 P.3d 903 
(quoting Smith v. Four Comers Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23,146,70 P.3d 904). 
Thus, "[i]mplicitly," this rule "requires not just bald citation to authority but 
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." State 
v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). In short, this Court "will not engage in 
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constructing arguments 'out of whole cloth7 on behalf of defendants/' State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65, 71 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted). 
Consequently, when the appellant fails to present any relevant authority, this 
Court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, f 12, 69 P.3d 
1278. Similarly, "[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis regarding a 
claim, [this Court will] decline to reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 
234, Tf 12, 52 P.3d 467. Rather, this Court will simply "decline to consider 
inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,549 (Utah App. 1998); 
see also State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,113, 72 P.3d 138. 
Here, Defendant claims that Sheriff Perkins had not authorized Officer Moore 
to arrest Defendant and that consequently the alleged arrest was unreasonable and 
unconstitutional. Br. Appellant at 9. Defendant cites to no legal authority for his 
argument that an arrest made without a superior's authorization is unreasonable 
and unconstitutional. In making his claim, Defendant cites to four cases, but none 
11 
of them address his lack-of-authorization claim.2 Thus, he has failed to cite relevant 
authority and failed to offer any meaningful analysis regarding his claim. This 
Court should therefore decline to review it.3 
2
 He cites State v. Amirkhizl, 2004 UT App 324, 100 P.3d 225, for the 
proposition that "[a]n illegal arrest cannot support a search incident to arrest"; State 
v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah App. 1998), and United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338, 347 (1974), for the proposition that "[t]he exclusionary rule requires 
exclusion of evidence" obtained pursuant to an illegal search or seizure; and Covey 
v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ]f 21,80 P.3d 553, for its definition of harmless error. Br. 
Appellant at 10-11. 
3
 Defendant's claim is not only inadequately briefed; it is also unpreserved. It 
is well settled that "claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, | 11,10 P.3d 346. "To preserve an issue for 
appeal, a defendant must enter an objection on the record that is both timely and 
specific." State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32, f 11,177 P.3d 637 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). "The objection must be specific enough to give the trial 
court notice of the very error7 of which [the party] complains." Id. (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). This preservation rule "applies to every claim, 
including constitutional questions." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 346. 
Defendant filed two motions to suppress below and two memoranda in 
support of his motion. See Rl90-97; 252-56. The memoranda argue that the stop and 
arrest were unsupported by probable cause, but not for the reasons set forth on 
appeal. They do not argue, as Defendant does on appeal, that the arrest was 
unwarranted because unauthorized by a superior. See id. Thus, Defendant did not 
preserve his lack-of-authorization claim. Moreover, as he argues no justification for 
review of his unpreserved claim, this Court should decline to review it. See State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
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B. Defendant cannot prevail on his claim, because whether the 
sheriff did or did not authorize the arrest is irrelevant to the 
lawfulness of the search and seizure. 
Defendant claims that he was unlawfully seized and searched when Officer 
Moore detained and handcuffed him because the sheriff had not, at that point, 
authorized the search. See Br. Appellant at 1, 9-11. He argues, "Because [Officer 
Moore's] actions went beyond, and were more intrusive and restrictive upon the 
Defendant, th[a]n his intent and his instructions from the Sheriff—because he 
arrested the Defendant without the determination by the Sheriff and despite the 
actual intent to merely detain him—the Deputy's actions were unauthorized, 
unreasonable, and constitute a violation of the Defendant's constitutional protection 
against unreasonable search and seizure, per the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution/'4 Id. at 9. 
Whether the sheriff had or had not authorized the arrest is irrelevant to his Fourth 
Amendment claim. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,375 n.l (2007) (concluding that 
an officer's seizing a fleeing and dangerous motorist by ramming his car was 
4
 Defendant has also inadequately briefed his state constitutional claim. He 
has not offered any "unique state constitutional analysis" in his brief to this Court, 
instead only offering "cursory references to the state constitution within arguments 
otherwise dedicated to a federal constitutional claim." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 
% 18-19,164 P.3d 397. Therefore, his state constitutional claim is not properly before 
this Court. 
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objectively reasonable, and observing that it was "irrelevant to [the court's Fourth 
Amendment] analysis whether [the officer] had permission to take the precise 
actions he took"). 
C. Probable cause justified Officer Moore's detention of 
Defendant 
Defendant claims that he was arrested when Officer Moore detained and 
handcuffed him while the sheriff went to seek arrest and search warrants. See Br. 
Appellant at 8-9. But Officer Moore stated that he did not arrest Defendant until 
about fifteen minutes later, when Sheriff Perkins called back to tell him to go ahead 
and make the arrest. R381:27. 
The State disputes Defendant's claim that the arrest occurred when Officer 
Moore handcuffed him.5 But whether the arrest occurred after Sheriff Perkins told 
5
 Contrary to Defendant's arguments, Br. Appellant at 8, the mere fact that 
the Officer Moore handcuffed him did not convert the temporary stop into an 
arrest. At least nine federal courts of appeal, including the Tenth Circuit, have 
determined that intrusive precautionary measures, such as using handcuffs or 
placing suspects on the ground, "do not necessarily turn a lawful Terry stop into 
an arrest under the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 
1463 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062,1064 (10th Cir. 
1993) (display of firearms and use of handcuffs); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 
1088 (7th Cir. 1993) (handcuffs); United States v. Saffeels, 982 F.2d 1199,1206 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (handcuffs), judgment vacated on other grounds, 510 U.S. 801 (1993); 
United States v. Esieke, 940 F.2d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1991) (handcuffs and leg irons); 
United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1989) (handcuffs); United 
(Footnote continues on following page.) 
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Officer Moore to detain Defendant, or later after the Sheriff told Officer Moore to 
make the arrest, is immaterial, where police had probable cause to justify an arrest 
at either point. 
An officer has probable cause to justify an arrest where the "facts and 
circumstances within the officer's knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent 
person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that 
the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense/7 State v. 
Tram, 2002 UT 97, \ 27, 57 P.3d 1052 (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 
(1979)). Where probable cause exists, an officer may make the arrest even without a 
warrant. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427 (1976) ("[T]he Fourth 
Amendment permits a duly authorized law enforcement officer to make a 
warrantless arrest in a public place/').6 
States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 790 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985) (placing suspect in 
police car in handcuffs); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(making suspect lie on ground in handcuffs); and additional unpublished 
decisions). 
6
 The officer may make the warrantless arrest "even though he had adequate 
opportunity to procure a warrant after developing probable cause for arrest/7 
Watson, 423 US. at 427. 
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In addition, under the "collective knowledge doctrine" or the "fellow officer 
rule," it is not necessary that the objective basis for a stop or arrest be based 
"solely on the knowledge of [a] detaining officer. Rather, the collective knowledge 
doctrine allows ... [it] to be based on the totality of the circumstances and 'the 
collective knowledge of all the officers involved.7" Prows, 2007 UT App 409, ^ 13, 
(addressing knowledge supporting reasonable suspicion to support a felony stop); 
see also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965) (recognizing observations 
of fellow officers form reliable basis to support probable cause to arrest). A seizure 
may "survive the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and 
seizures if performed by an officer who objectively relies on information, bulletins, 
or flyers received from other law enforcement sources." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 
1276-77 (Utah App. 1994) (addressing investigative stops). 
Here, Sheriff Perkins had probable cause to justify an arrest both at the time 
he first told Officer Moore to detain Defendant and when he later called Officer 
Moore to tell him to go ahead and make the arrest. Before Officer Moore stopped 
Defendant, at least four people had told the sheriff that Defendant had distributed 
methamphetamine to them in the six-week period preceding the arrest. See R381:15, 
16 
24,89-91,98-102.7 Two of them had told the sheriff that Defendant had distributed 
to them on multiple occasions during this time frame. See R381:24, 98-102,114-15. 
One of them, Jeff Burton, called and met the sheriff immediately after Defendant 
gave him methamphetamine on the day of the alleged arrest. R381:115. Burton 
gave the sheriff the methamphetamine that he had received and told the sheriff that 
Defendant had three more "boulders" of methamphetamine on his person. 
R3891:115. Based on this information, the sheriff had probable cause to believe that 
Defendant had committed numerous distribution offenses, that he had just 
distributed again, and that he was at the time in possession of methamphetamine. 
Thus, the sheriff had probable cause both when he first told Officer Moore to detain 
Perkins and also when, after visiting with the county attorney, he told Officer Moore 
to go ahead and make the arrest. 
In addition, under the collective knowledge doctrine, Officer Moore was 
entitled to rely on the circumstances and facts known to Sheriff Perkins. Because the 
7
 Moreover, even though at least two of these people had received favorable 
treatment for their cooperation, which could cause "some doubt as to [their] 
motives," their "detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with [their] 
statements] that the event[s] were observed first hand, entitle[d] [their] tip[s] to 
greater weight than might otherwise be the case." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,233 
(1983). 
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facts known to the sheriff supported probable cause to believe that Defendant had 
committed and was committing drug offenses, they also provided probable cause to 
justify Officer Moore's arresting Defendant. 
D. Defendant's claim that the trial court should have suppressed 
the evidence found on his person was relevant only to his 
conviction on Count 8. Even if he could prevail on his claim, it 
would not affect his convictions on the other eleven counts. 
Defendant claims that Officer Moore arrested him without authority and that 
the methamphetamine found in his pocket following the arrest should have been 
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Br. Appellant at 9-10. But even if 
Defendant could prevail on that claim, the methamphetairdne taken from his pocket 
supported only one of the charged counts — count 8. Defendant has not argued nor 
established that admission of that evidence affected his convictions on the other 
counts. See Br. Appellant at 7-11. 
First, Defendant has not argued that any evidence found during the inventory 
search of his truck — the marijuana found in the cappuccino canister and the canister 
itself and the brass and glass pipes that it held — should have been excluded. See id. 
He does not argue that the offenses based on his possession of these items should be 
reversed. See id. And he does not argue that the distribution offenses underlying 
counts 1 to 7 should be reversed. See id. Nor should he. The information and 
evidence supporting the' guilty verdicts on these offenses — the testimony of the 
individuals who received the marijuana and the rock of methamphetamine given to 
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Jeff Burton—was given to the sheriff before the sheriff asked Officer Moore to detain 
Defendant and was independent of anything found during the detention. See 
R381:15, 24, 89-102,114-15. 
For these reasons, the trial court properly denied Defendant's motions to 
suppress. See R103-04; 233-39. And even assuming the trial court erred when it 
denied the motion to suppress the cocaine found on Defendant's person at the time 
he was stopped and then arrested, that error would only have affected the 
admissibility of the evidence obtained on Defendant's person—evidence relevant 
only to the conviction on count 8. 
II. 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE A RECORD TO 
SUPPORT HIS VOIR DIRE CLAIM 
Defendant claims that the record is inadequate to provide review of a 
potential voir dire claim and that his convictions should therefore be reversed. See 
Br. Appellant at at 11-13. In making his claim, Defendant disregards his burden to 
present an adequate record on appeal. 
Parties claiming error on appeal have a duty and responsibility to support 
their allegations with an adequate record. See State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 131 
(Utah App. 1997). "'This Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends for 
its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record.'" Id. (quoting State v. 
Barella, 714 P.2d 287,288 (Utah 1986) (additional quotation omitted)). In the face of 
19 
"an [in]adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the 
proceedings below." State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403,405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); State 
v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688,699 (Utah App. 1995) (assuming regularity of proceedings 
below because appellant failed to include transcript on appeal); see also State v. 
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982) (the appellate court "cannot rule on a 
question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the 
record"). 
Where "the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the 
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion." Utah R. 
App. P. 11(e)(2). "Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct 
appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript." Id. 
"When the certified record is incomplete, rule 11 'establishes a procedure for 
supplementing the record when necessary/" Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health 
Or., 2003 UT 23, f 33, 70 P.3d 904 (quoting Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 
1356, 1359 (Utah Ct.App.1991)). "'[A] motion under Rule 11(h) is appropriate ... 
when the record must be augmented because of an omission or exclusion, or a 
dispute as to the accuracy of reporting/" Id. (quoting Olson, 815 P.2d at 1359) (citing 
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 478-79 & n. 17 (Utah 1990)). 
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Here, after receiving the trial transcript and before filing his Brief of 
Appellant, Defendant had notice that the voir dire portion of the trial proceedings 
had been not been included in the trial transcript. See R384:5 (trial transcript filed in 
appellate court on August 31, 2009); Br. Appellant at 13 (filed on November 12, 
2009). But Defendant, who had the burden to present an adequate record to support 
review, did not file a motion under rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to 
supplement the record with the omitted material. Defendant did not move to 
supplement the proceedings; did not demonstrate that a transcript of the missing 
voir dire proceedings had not been made or could not be made; and, even assuming 
that a transcript had not been and could not be made, did not demonstrate that the 
missing portions of the record could not be adequately reconstructed. See Br. 
Appellant at 11-13. Instead, he simply speculated that the missing transcript might 
have provided grounds for a claim on appeal "that certain jurors should have been 
stricken/ / See id. at 12. 
Where Defendant has not presented an adequate record on appeal or shown 
that the record cannot be presented, this Court must presume the regularity of the 
proceedings below. See Miller, 781 P.2d at 405; Barella, 714 P.2d at 288; Wujfenstein, 
657 P.2d at 293; Snyder, 932 P.2d at 131; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 699. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted March |5 , 2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEANNE B. INOUYE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
GARFIELD COUNTY 
55 South Main Street, Panguitch, Utah 84759 
Telephone: (435) 676-8826; Facsimile: (435) 676-8239 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK TALBOT, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 071600017 
Judge. David L. Mower 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on August 22, 2008, for Sentencing stemming 
from a jury conviction which wras handed down on June 3, 2008 The State of Utah was 
represented by Barry L. Huntington, Garfield County Attorney. The Defendant was present with 
Cathy Johnstone, Public Defender. The Court reviewed the convictions against the defendant 
and discussed with counsel sentencing recommendations. The Court also heard a statement from 
the defendant. 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
SENTENCE. On Counts 1 through 3, DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO 
JD23320788 pages: 4 
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DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (METHAMPHETAMINE) (PRIOR), first 
degree felonies, the defendant is sentenced to five (5) years to life in the Utah State Prison. No 
fine was imposed. The sentence shall run concurrently. 
On Count 4, DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (METHAMPHETAMINE) (PRIOR), a first degree felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to serve five(5) years to life in the Utah State Prison. No fine was 
imposed. This sentence shall run consecutively. 
On Count 5, DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (METHAMPHETAMINE) (PRIOR), a first degree felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to serve five(5) years to life in the Utah State Prison. No fine was 
imposed. This sentence shall run consecutively. 
Counts 6 and 7, DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (METHAMPHETAMINE) (PRIOR), first degree felonies, 
the defendant is sentenced to serve five (5) years to life in the Utah State Prison. No fine was 
imposed. This sentence shall run concurrently. 
Count 8, POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (D.F.Z., 
METHAMPHETAMINE), a second degree felony, the defendant is sentenced to serve one (1) 
to fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison. No fine was imposed. This sentence shall run 
concurrently. 
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Count 9, POSSESSION OF USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (D.F.Z., 
MARIJUANA), a class A misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to serve one (1) year in the 
Garfield County jail. However, this sentence shall be served in the Utah State Prison and the 
sentence shall run concurrently. 
Counts 10-12 POSSESSION OR USE OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, (D.F.Z), class 
A misdemeanors, the defendant is sentenced to serve three one (1) year terms in the Garfield 
County jail. However, this sentence shall be served in the Utah State Prison and the sentence 
shall run concurrently. 
The Board of Pardons and Parole is directed to note the defendant has serve 480 days in 
the Garfield County Jail. 
The defendant wras remanded to the custody of the Garfield County Sheriff pending 
transportation to the Utah State Prison. 
RIGHT TO MOVE TO APPEAL: The defendant is notified that he has 30 days from 
the date hereof in which to move to appeal the sentence of the Court. ^-—^ 
Signed on ^ - W ,
 2008 x A k / ?;^>t<S 
r-T 
DAVID L. MOWER, District Count Jtfdse v # --T; 
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DISTRICT COURT, GARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH 
55 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
PANGUITCH, UTAH 84759 
Telephone: 435-676-1104 Fax: 435-676-8239 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK D.TALBOT, 
Defendant 
On January 21,2008, Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress Evidence. The State filed 
its Objection on January 23,2008. Defendant did not reply. The State submitted this Motion for 
a decision on January 31,2008. Neither party requested a hearing. This Motion is now ready for 
a decision. 
DECISION 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence should be denied. 
ANALYSIS 
As a preliminary matter, Defendant's memorandum in support of his Motion to Suppress 
is not in compliance with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12(d)(3). Rule 12(d)(3) 
requires that a motion to suppress include "sufficient legal and factual grounds." Defendant's 
memorandum includes neither a statement of facts nor citations to legal authorities. This made it 
a lot more difficult to analyze and to consider Defendant's Motion. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE 
Case No. 071600017 
Assigned Judge: DAVID L.MOWER 
CD22935858 pages: 8 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS, Case number 071600017, 
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The State opposes Defendant's Motion on the ground that it is too late. The jury trial in 
this matter is scheduled for February 13, 2008 through February 15,2008. The State argues that 
the Defendant's Motion came too close to the trial. 
Under Rule 12(c)(1)(B), Defendant must file a motion to suppress at least five days prior 
to trial. Defendant is in compliance with this rule. Defendant's Motion should be considered on 
its merits. 
Defendant seeks to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of a search warrant and 
arrest of the Defendant 
Defendant argues that the search warrant affidavit did not state sufficient facts to support 
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. Defendants points to the following flaws in the 
affidavit. First, the affidavit contains a statement that the Defendant was previously convicted of 
similar offense in 2002 and served time in prison. ^13. Defendant believes this statement is 
prejudicial and does not aid in the finding of probable cause. 
Second, the affidavit failed to include information that a urine test to detect 
methamphetamine is ineffective after three days. 
Third, the affidavit is based on stale information, which does not support a finding of 
probable cause. 
Fourth, the affidavit lacks allegations about specific items to be found in specific places. 
Defendant also challenges the propriety of his arrest on the basis that no crime was 
committed in the presence of a police officer at the time of the arrest. 
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A. Sufficiency of the Search Warrant Affidavit 
In determining the existence of probable cause, the Court must examine the search 
warrant affidavit under a "totality-of-the-circumstances" test. State v. Saddler, 104 P3d 1265, 
1268-69 (Utah 2004). The Court must reach a "practical... [and] common-sense decision" that 
"given all the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the contraband will be found in the 
place described." Id. Among other factors, the Court considers reliability of the informants, their 
veracity, basis of knowledge, and corroboration by the police of the information received. Id. 
The affidavit contains references to statements by four individuals that they had been 
given methamphetamine by the Defendant on January 24,2007 and that they had used it in the 
Defendant's home on that date. W~7. The individuals made those statements on the following 
dates: Michelle Partridge on January 26, 2007; Ronald Davenport on February 6,2007; Stacy 
Clark on February 9,2007; and Michelle Clark on February 10,2007. Id. 
Further, a testifying police officer received a phone call on March 1,2007 from a 
concerned neighbor about people visiting Defendant's house at odd hours and for short periods 
of time. Search Warrant Affidavit, [^8. In his experience, such activity is consistent with drug use 
or sales. Id. 
On March 1,2007, a confidential informant told the police that he had used 
methamphetamine with the Defendant at the Defendant's house on February 28,2007. Id., [^9. 
This confidential informant gave a urine sample, which tested positive for methamphetamine. Id. 
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The same confidential informant told the police that he received methamphetamine from 
the Defendant on March 6,2007. Id., IflO. Fifteen minutes after receiving this information, the 
police met with the confidential informant. Id., fll 1. The informant gave them a white rock 
substance, which appeared to be methamphetamine. Id. 
The affidavit explains that the statements made by the above mentioned' individuals are 
reliable because these individuals are familiar with methamphetamine and with its users, 
producers, and distributors. Id., J^3. 
Based on this information, Defendant was arrested on March 6,2007. He was searched. 
Two large white rocks that appeared to be methamphetamine were found in his pocket. Id., T|I2. 
I conclude that the affidavit contains sufficient facts to support a finding of probable 
cause. The information about drug activity in the Defendant's home came from five individuals. 
They each independently stated that the Defendant supplied them with methamphetamine on 
January 24,2007, February 28,2007, and March 6,2007. 
The police also received methamphetamine from the confidential informant on March 6, 
2007 fifteen minutes after the drug transaction between the confidential informant and the 
Defendant 
In addition, there was information received from a concerned citizen that suspicious 
activity was going on at the Defendant's residence. A concerned citizen's testimony is presumed 
to be reliable and honest State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284,287-88 (Utah App. 1990). 
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Finally, at the time of the Defendant's arrest, police found methamphetamine on his 
person. 
Under a totality-of-circumstances test, the affidavit provides probable cause to issue a 
warrant to search the Defendant's residence and to seize the Defendant's bodily fluids. 
Defendant argues that the affidavit failed to include the information that a urine test to 
detect methamphetamine is not effective after three days. The statement from the confidential 
informant was that the Defendant used methamphetamine on February 28,2007. The search 
warrant was issued on March 6,2007. Defendant claims that on March 6,2007, a urine test was 
unnecessary because no methamphetamine couid be detected at that time. 
Generally, the Court must examine the affidavit within its four corners. However, in some 
circumstances a defendant may be entitled to bring in extraneous information to challenge the 
validity of a search warrant Such circumstances exist when (1) an affiant made a false statement 
(in this case omission) intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (2) 
the affidavit is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause after the misstatement is set 
aside or omission is inserted. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188,191 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, the affidavit does not become insufficient if the omitted information is 
inserted. Even if a magistrate knew at the time of examining the affidavit that methamphetamine 
stays in the system only for three days, there is a probable cause to conclude that the Defendant 
may have used drugs after February 28,2007. Methamphetamine was found on the Defendant's 
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person at the time of arrest on March 6,2007. The search warrant for the search of the 
Defendant's bodily fluids was also issued on that day. 
Thus, the Defendant may not use extraneous information to challenge the affidavit in this 
case. 
The statement that the Defendant had been previously convicted of a similar offense does 
not aid in the finding of probable cause. However, it also does not render this affidavit 
insufficient. Thus, this argument has to be rejected. 
Finally, the affidavit did not specify which particular items the police were looking for. 
However, this deficiency is cured by a search warrant. A search warrant states that the police are 
authorized to search for controlled substances and drug paraphernalia. 
I conclude that the affidavit contains sufficient facts to support a finding of probable 
cause. Evidence obtained as a result of a search warrant should not be suppressed. 
B. Arrest 
Police must have probable cause in order to arrest an individual. Probable cause exists 
when a police officer knows of the facts that are "sufficient... to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." State v. Worwood, 164 P.3d 
397,409^34 (Utah 2007). 
Prior to the Defendant's arrest, the police had information from five different people 
about drug distribution and use in the Defendant's home. Police also had a tip from a concerned 
citizen about suspicious activity in the house. Finally, a confidential informant told the police 
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that he received methamphetamine from the Defendant and saw the Defendant use 
methamphetamine on February 28,2007. Police received methamphetamine from this 
confidential informant 
These facts are sufficient to apprise a man of reasonable caution that an offense has been 
committed. Thus, the police had probable cause to arrest the Defendant. 
The evidence obtained as a result of the arrest should not be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied. 
David L 
Mower 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK D. TALBOT, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
SECOND MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE 
Case No. 071600017 
Assigned Judge DAVID L. M O W E R 
Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress on March 31. 2008. This is the second motion to 
suppress. The State objected on April 10, 2008; and the Defendant replied on April 16, 2008. 
The State then filed a Second Objection to Defense's Motion to Suppress Evidence on April 23, 
2008!. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is now ready for a decision. 
DECISION 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence should be denied. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant filed his first motion to suppress on January 21, 2008. He raised two issues: 
(1) sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit and (2) existence of probable cause for arrest. 
11 do not consider this pleading in making a decision because it is not permitted by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 7(c)(1). ,
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The Court issued its Memorandum Decision on this motion on February 5, 2008. It was 
determined that a search warrant affidavit was sufficient, and that the police had probable cause 
to arrest the Defendant. 
In the present Motion to Suppress, Defendant challenges the legality of his initial stop. 
On March 6, 2007, Defendant was stopped while driving. He was searched and arrested. 
Defendant argues that the police did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion that he had 
committed or was about to commit a crime. State v Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). 
I have already determined that the police had probable cause to arrest the Defendant. 
Consequently, the police also had reasonable articulable suspicion that the Defendant had 
committed a crime. 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
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